University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Informatics - Papers (Archive)

Faculty of Engineering and Information
Sciences

January 1999

Crypto Topics And Applications II
Jennifer Seberry
University of Wollongong, jennie@uow.edu.au

C. Charnes
University of Wollongong

J. Pieprzyk
University of Wollongong

R. Safavi-Naini
University of Wollongong, rei@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers
Part of the Physical Sciences and Mathematics Commons

Recommended Citation
Seberry, Jennifer; Charnes, C.; Pieprzyk, J.; and Safavi-Naini, R.: Crypto Topics And Applications II 1999.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/349

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

Crypto Topics And Applications II
Abstract
In this chapter we continue our exposition of the crypto topics which was begun in the previous chapter.
This chapter covers: Secret Sharing, Threshold Cryptography, Signature Schemes, and finally Quantum
Key Distribution and Quantum Cryptography. As in the previous chapter, we have focused only on the
essentials of each topic. We have included in the bibliography sufficient items which can be consulted for
further details.

Disciplines
Physical Sciences and Mathematics

Publication Details
The chapter was originally published as Seberry, J, Charnes, C, Pieprzyk, J and Safavi-Naini, Crypto Topics
And Applications I, in Atallah, MJ (ed), The CRC Handbook of Algorithms and Theory of Computation, CRC
Press, Boca Raton, Florida, 1999, 41.1-41.30. Copyright Taylor & Francis.

This book chapter is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/infopapers/349

41 CRYPTO TOPICS AND APPLICATIONS II
Jennifer Seberry, Chris Charnes, Josef Pieprzyk, and Rei Safavi-Naini
Center for Computer Security Research, University of Wollongong

0.42 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we continue our exposition of the crypto topics which was begun in the previous
chapter. This chapter covers: Secret Sharing, Threshold Cryptography, Signature Schemes, and
nally Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Cryptography. As in the previous chapter,
we have focussed only on the essentials of each topic. We have included in the bibliography
sucient items which can be consulted for further details.
First we give a synopsis of the topics which are discussed in this chapter.
Secret sharing is concerned with the problem of how to distribute a secret among a group of
participating individuals, or entities, so that only pre-designated collections of individuals are
able to recreate the secret by collectively combining the parts of the secret which were allocated
to them. There are numerous applications of secret sharing schemes in practice. One example
of secret sharing occurs in banking. For instance, the combination to a vault may be distributed
in such a way that only speci ed collections of employees can open the vault by pooling their
portions of the combination. In this way the authority to initiate an action, e.g., the opening of
a bank vault, is divided for the purposes of providing security and for added functionality such
as auditing if required.
Threshold cryptography is a relatively recently studied area of cryptography. It deals with situations where the authority to initiate or perform cryptographic operations is distributed amongst
a group of individuals. Many of the standard operations of single-user cryptography have counterparts in threshold cryptography.
Signature schemes deal with the problem of generating and verifying (electronic) signatures for
documents. A sub-class of signature schemes is concerned with the shared-generation and shared-
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veri cation of signatures, where a collaborating group of individuals is required to perform these
actions.
A new paradigm of security has recently been introduced into cryptography with the emergence
of the ideas of Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Cryptography. While classical cryptography employs various mathematical techniques to restrict eavesdroppers from learning the
contents of encrypted messages, in quantum mechanics the information is protected by the laws
of physics.

0.43 Secret Sharing
0.43.1 Introduction
Secret sharing is concerned with the problem of distributing a secret among a group of participating individuals, or entities, so that only pre-designated collections of individuals are able to
recreate the secret by collectively combining their shares of the secret.
The earliest and the most widely studied type of secret sharing schemes are called (t; n)-threshold
schemes. In these schemes the access structure { a speci cation of the participants which are
authorized to recreate the secret { comprises all the possible t-element subsets selected from a
n-element set.
The problem of realizing, i.e., implementing secret sharing schemes for threshold structures was
solved independently by Blakley [12] and Shamir [75] in 1979. Shamir's solution is based on the
property of polynomial interpolation in nite elds; Blakley formulated and solved the problem
in terms of nite geometries.
In a (t; n)-threshold scheme, each of the n participants holds some shares (also called, shadows)
of the secret. The parameter t  n is called the threshold value. A fundamental property of a
(t; n)-threshold scheme is that the secret can only be recreated if at least t shareholders combine
their shares, but less than t shareholders cannot recreate the secret. The fact that the key can
be recovered from the combined shares of any t-sized subset is a property which makes threshold
schemes very useful in key management. Threshold schemes tolerate the invalidation of up to
n t shares { the secret can still be recreated from the remaining intact shares.
2

Secret sharing schemes are also used to control the authority to perform critical actions. For
example, a bank vault can be opened only if say, any two out of three trusted employees of the
bank agree to do so by combining their partial knowledge of the vault combination. In this case,
even if any one of the three employees is not present at any given time the vault can still be
opened, and no single employee has sucient information about the combination to open the
vault.
Secret sharing schemes which do not reveal any information about the shared secret to unauthorized individuals are called perfect. This notion will be formally de ned in Section 0.43.2. In
this survey we discuss both perfect and non-perfect schemes, as the latter schemes are proving
to be useful in various secret sharing applications.
Besides the (t; n)-threshold structures, more general access structures are encountered in the
theory of secret sharing. These will be considered in Section 0.43.13. General access structures
apply to situations where the trust-status of the the participants is not uniform. For example,
in the bank scenario described earlier, it might be considered more secure to authorize either
the bank manager, or any two out of three senior employees to open the vault.
Since Blakley's and Shamir's papers have appeared, the study of secret sharing has developed
into an active area of research in cryptography. The fundamental problem of the theory and
practice of secret sharing deals with the issue of how to implement secret sharing schemes for
arbitrary access structures. We shall describe later some of the solutions to this problem. Simmons [79] gives numerous examples of practical situations which require secret sharing schemes.
He also gives a detailed account of the geometric approach to secret sharing. Stinson's [84]
survey is broader and more condensed.
Simmons [78] discusses secret sharing schemes with extended capabilities. He argues that there
are realistic applications in which schemes with extended capabilities are required. We assume
there exists a key distribution center (KDC) which is trusted unconditionally.

0.43.2 Models of secret sharing
A common model of secret sharing has two phases. In the initialization phase, a trusted entity
{ the dealer, distributes shares of a secret to the participants via secure means. In the recon3

struction phase the authorized participants submit their shares to a combiner, who reconstructs
the secret on their behalf. It is assumed that the combiner is an algorithm which only performs
the task of reconstructing the secret. We denote the sets of all possible secrets and shares by K
and S respectively; the set of participants in a scheme is denoted by P . Secret sharing schemes
can be modeled using the information theory concept of entropy (cf. [45]). This approach was
initiated by Karnin, Greene and Hellman [54] and developed further by Capocelli, De Santis,
Gargano and Vaccaro [23].

De nition 1 A secret sharing scheme is a collection of two algorithms. The rst (the dealer)
is a probabilistic mapping

D : K ! S1  S2  : : :  Sn
where Si  S (i = 1; 2; : : :; n) and Si is a subset of shares which is used to generate a share for
the participant Pi 2 P . The second (the combiner) is a function

C : Si  Si  : : :  Sit ! K
1

2

such that if the corresponding subset of participants fPi ; Pi ; : : :; Pit g belongs to the access structure , it produces the secret K 2 K, i.e.
1

2

H (K j Pi ; Pi ; : : :; Pit ) = 0:
1

2

(1)

The combiner fails to recompute the secret if the subset of participants does not belong to the
access structure , i.e.
H (K j Sl)  0
(2)
for Sl = fsi ; si ; : : :; sil g and Sl 2= .
1

2

In equation (1), H (K j Pi ; Pi ; : : :; Pit ) is calculated with respect to the shares of the participants. A secret sharing scheme is called perfect if H (K j Sl ) = H (K ) for any unauthorized
subset of participants, i.e., not belonging to an access structure (cf. Section 0.43.13).
1

2

The following result is proved by Karnin et al [54].

Theorem 1 A necessary condition for a perfect threshold scheme is that for each share si, the
inequality H (si )  H (K ) holds.
4

Most of the secret sharing schemes which we discuss satisfy this inequality, but we will also consider in Section 0.43.17 schemes, which do not satisfy this inequality; these are called nonperfect
schemes.

The matrix model
A matrix representation of perfect secret sharing schemes was introduced by Brickell and Stinson
[21]. The matrix model is often used in theoretical investigations of secret sharing. In this
model a perfect secret sharing scheme is formulated as a matrix M which is known by all the
participants P in the scheme. The jPj +1 columns of M are indexed as follows. The rst column
corresponds to the dealer D, the remaining columns are indexed by the remaining participants
in P . Each row of M contains one of the possible keys K which is to be shared in column D,
and the shares of K are located in the remaining columns. When the dealer wants share K , a
row r which has K in the D-column is chosen uniformly and randomly. The dealer distributes
the shares of K to each participant using the matrix M , i.e. participant Pj receives the entry
Mr;j as his share.
The general requirements of a perfect secret scheme translate into the following combinatorial
conditions in the matrix model, cf. Stinson [84], and Blundo, De Santis, Stinson and Vaccaro
[15]. Suppose that is an access structure.
1. If B 2 and M (r; P ) = M (r0; P ) for all P 2 B, then M (r; D) = M (r0 ; D).
2. If B 62 , then for every possible assignment f of shares to the participants in B, say
f = (fP : P 2 B), a nonnegative integer (f; B) exists such that

jfr : M (r; P ) = fP 8P 2 B; M (r; D) = K gj = (f; B)
is independent of the value of K .

0.43.3 a Information rate
The information rate of secret sharing schemes was studied by Brickell and Stinson [21]. It is
a measure of the amount of information that the participants need to keep secret in a secret
sharing scheme. The information rate of a participant Pi in a secret sharing scheme with jSi j
5

shares is:

log2jKj :
i = log
jS j
2 i

The information rate of the scheme, denoted , is de ned to be the minimum of the i.
A proof of the fact that   1 is given by Stinson [84]. This result motivates the de nition of
ideal secret sharing schemes.

De nition 2 A perfect secret sharing scheme is called ideal if  = 1; that is, if the size of each
participants share, measured in the number of bits, equals the size of the secret.

We now de ne another measure used to quantify the comparison between secret sharing schemes
(cf. Section 0.43.13).

De nition 3 ( ) is the maximum value of  for any perfect secret sharing scheme realizing
the access structure .

For any access structure it is desirable to implement a secret sharing scheme with information
rate close to 1. This minimizes the amount of information that needs to be kept secret by the
participants, which means that there is a greater chance of the scheme remaining secure. For
example, a (t; n)-threshold scheme implemented as in Shamir's method is ideal, but when the
scheme is modi ed to prevent cheating as proposed by Tompa and Woll [87], it is no longer ideal.
(Cf. Section 0.43.12.)

0.43.4 Some known schemes
We now describe several well known threshold secret sharing schemes.

0.43.5 b Blakley's scheme
Blakley [12] implements threshold schemes using projective spaces over nite elds GF (q ). A
projective space PG(t; q ) is de ned from the corresponding t +1-dimensional vector space V (t +
1; q ) by omitting the zero vector of V (t +1; q ) and identifying two vectors v and v 0 satisfying the
relation v = v 0, where  is a non-zero element of GF (q ). This de nes an equivalence relation
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on V (t + 1; q ). The set of equivalence classes, i.e, the lines through the origin of V (t + 1; q ),
are the points of PG(t; q ); there are (q t 1)=(q 1) such points. Similarly, each k-dimensional
subspace of V (t + 1; q ) corresponds to a (k 1)-dimensional subspace of PG(t; q ). Every point
of PG(t; q ) lies on (q t 1)=(q 1) (t 1)-dimensional subspaces which are called the hyperplanes
of PG(t; q ).
To realize a (t; n)-threshold scheme, the secret is represented by a point p chosen randomly from
PG(t; q); each point p belongs to (q t 1)=(q 1) hyperplanes. The shares of the secret are the n
hyperplanes, which are randomly selected and distributed to the participants. If q is suciently
large and n is not too large, then the probability that any t of the hyperplanes intersect in some
point other than p, is close to zero, cf. Blakley [12]. Thus generally the secret can be recovered
from any t of the n shares. The secret cannot be recovered from the knowledge of less than
t hyperplanes, as these will intersect only in some sub-space containing p. This scheme is not
perfect, since a coalition of unauthorized insider participants has a greater chance of guessing
the secret than an unauthorized group of outsider participants.
Blakley's geometric solution to the secret sharing problem has grown into an active area of
research. We will cover some of these developments in this survey.

0.43.6 c Simmons' scheme
Simmons formulates secret sharing schemes in terms of ane spaces instead of projective spaces.
The reasons for using ane spaces instead of projective spaces are explained by Simmons [79].
(There is a correspondence between projective spaces and ane spaces, cf. Beth, Jungnickel
and Lenz [9].) Brie y, an ane space AG(n; q ) consist of points { the vectors of V (n; q ), and
a hierarchy of l-dimensional subspaces for l  n and their cosets. These correspond to the
equivalence classes in projective geometry mentioned above, and are called the ats of AG(n; q ).
The equivalence classes of lines, planes, etc. of AG(t; q ) are: the 1-dimensional, 2-dimensional
etc. ats. A hyperplane is a at of co-dimension one. To realize a (t; n)-threshold scheme in
AG(t; q ), the secret is represented by a point p chosen randomly from AG(t; q ), which lies on a
publicly known line Vd , (lines have q points). A hyperplane Vi of the indicator variety is selected
so that Vi intersects Vd in a single point p. The shares of the secret are the subsets of points of
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Vi. An authorized subset of participants, which spans Vi, enables reconstruction of the secret.
If an unauthorized subset of participants attempts to reconstruct the secret, their shares will
only span a at which intersects Vd in the empty set. Thus they gain no information about
the secret. The precise amount of information gained by the unauthorized participants about
the secret can be expressed in terms of the de ning parameters of AG(n; q ). These schemes
are perfect. Simmons [79] gives a detailed explanation of the implementation of secret sharing
schemes using projective and ane spaces.

0.43.7 d Shamir's scheme
Shamir's [75] scheme realizes (t; n)-access structures based on polynomial interpolation over
nite elds. In his scheme the secrets S belong to a prime power nite eld GF (q ), which
satis es q  n + 1: In the initialization phase, the dealer D chooses n distinct nonzero elements
fx1; : : :; xng from GF (q) and allocates these to participants fP1; : : :; Png. This correspondence
is publicly known, and creates undesirable side e ects if any of the participants are dishonest;
see Section 0.43.12. However for now, we will assume that all the participants obey faithfully
the protocol for reconstructing the secret.
Fix a random element of GF (q ) as the secret K . The shares of K are created using the following
protocol.
(a) D chooses a1 ; a2; : : :; at 1 from GF (q ) randomly, uniformly and independently.
(b) Let a(x) be a polynomial of degree at most t 1, de ned as a(x) = K + a1x + a2x2 +    +
ak 1 xk 1.
(c) The shares of the secret key are: yi = a(xi ), for 1  i  n.
With the above data, if any t out of the n participants fxi ; : : :; xit g, combine their shares
fyi ; : : :; yit g, then using Lagrangian interpolation, there is a unique polynomial of degree at
most t 1 passing through the points: f(xi ; yi ); : : :; (xit ; yit )g. So the combined shares of
the t participants can be used to recreate the polynomial a(x), and hence the secret, which is
K = a(0).
1

1

1

1
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The relation between the secret and the shares is obtained from Lagrange's interpolation formula
as:

K=

t
X
j =1

yij bj ;

(3)

where the bj are de ned as

bj =

Y

xik

1  k  t;
k 6= j

xik xij :

Shamir's scheme is computationally ecient in terms of the computational e ort required to
create the shares and to recover the secret. Also the share size is optimal in an information
theoretic sense, cf. Section 2.
The reconstruction phase in Shamir's scheme can also be considered as a system of linear equations, which are de ned by the shares Ki. If t shares are submitted to the combiner, the system
of linear equations:

yij = K + a1 xij + a2 x2ij +    ak 1 xkij 1 ; j = 1; : : :t
can be solved for the unknowns K; a1; a2; : : :; at 1 because the determinant of this system of
equations is a nonsingular Vandermonde determinant. (The fx1; : : :; xn g are pair-wise distinct.)
However, if t 1 participants try to reconstruct the secret, they face the problem of solving
t 1 linear equations in t unknowns. This system of equations has one degree of freedom.
Consequently, t 1 participants do not obtain any information about the secret, as K was
selected uniformly and randomly from GF (q ). Shamir's system is perfect.

0.43.8 e A (t; t) threshold scheme
Karnin et al [54] describe a secret sharing scheme which realizes (t; t)-access structures. The
interest in such schemes is that they can be used as the basis for other cryptographic constructions.
9

In their scheme, the set of secrets S is the the ring of residue classes Zm , where m is any integer.
(In applications m is large.) The secret K is shared using the following algorithm.
(a) D secretly chooses randomly, uniformly and independently t 1 elements y1 ; y2; : : :; yt
from Zm ; yt is de ned as
t 1
X
yt = K
yi mod m:

1

i=1

(b) Participant Pi for 1  i  t, receives the share yi from D.
The above system is perfect, as the following argument shows. The set of shares of l < t particiP
pants attempting to reconstruct the secret either contains the share yt = K ti=11 yi mod m, or
not. In both cases the (unauthorized) participants lack the necessary information to determine
K . Shamir's scheme with t = n provides an alternative construction of (t; t)-threshold schemes,
using the elds GF (q ) instead of Zm .

0.43.9 Threshold schemes and discrete logarithms
The discrete logarithm has been widely employed in the literature to transform threshold schemes
into conditionally secure schemes with extra properties. This idea is exploited in the papers by:
Benaloh [1], Beth [10], Charnes, Pieprzyk and Safavi-Naini [27], Charnes and Pieprzyk [28], Lin
and Harn [58], Langford [56], and Hwang and Chang [50].
It is a consequence of the linearity of equation (3) that Shamir's scheme can be modi ed to obtain
schemes having enhanced properties such as disenrollment capability, in which shares from one
or more participants can be made incapable of forming an updated secret. (The formal analysis
of schemes with this property was given by Blakley, Blakley, Chan and Massey [13].) Let a(x)
be a polynomial and let a(i) be the shares as in Shamir's scheme. In the modi ed threshold
scheme proposed by Charnes, Pieprzyk and Safavi-Naini [27], g a(0) is the secret and the shares
are si = g ci , ci = a(i). A generator g of the cyclic group of the eld GF (2n ) is chosen so that
2n 1 is a Mersenne prime.
The modi ed (t; n)-threshold schemes are capable of disenrolling participants whose shares have
been compromised either through loss or theft, and still maintain the original threshold level. In
the event that some of the original shares are compromised, the KDC can issue using a public
10

authenticated channel a new generator g 0 of the cyclic group of GF (2n ). The shareholders can
calculate their new shares si 0 from the initial secret data according to

si 0 = g0ci :
Hwang and Chang [50] used a similar setting to obtain dynamic threshold schemes.
Threshold schemes with disenrollment capability, without the assumption of the intractability of
the discrete logarithm problem, can be based on families of threshold schemes. The properties
of these schemes are studied in a paper by Charnes, Pieprzyk and Safavi-Naini [26]; here we
provide the basic de nition.

De nition 4 A threshold scheme family (TSF) is de ned by an (m  n) matrix of shares [si;j ]
such that:
1. Any row (si;1; si;2; : : :; si;n ) represents an instance of TSri (ti ; n) where i = 1; : : :; m.
2. Any column (s1;j ; s2;j ; : : :; sm;j ) represents an instance of TScj (tj ; m) where j = 1; : : :; n.

A family of threshold schemes in which all rows and all columns are ideal schemes is called an
ideal threshold scheme family, or ITS family for short. In these schemes it is possible to alter
dynamically the threshold values by moving from one level of the matrix to another.
Lin and Harn [58] and Langford [56] use the discrete logarithm to transform Shamir's scheme
into a conditionally secure scheme which does not require a trusted KDC. A similar approach is
used by Langford [56] to obtain a threshold signature scheme. Beth [10] describes a protocol for
veri able secret sharing for general access structures based on geometric schemes. The discrete
logarithm problem is used to encode the secret and the shares so that they can be publicly
announced for veri cation purposes.
It should be noted that the de nition of disenrollment given by Charnes et al [27] is not the same
as that of Blakley et al [13]. Blakley et al establish a lower bound on the number of bits required
to encode the shares in schemes with disenrollment. Their bound shows that this number grows
linearly with the number of disenrollments. They also present two geometric (t; n)-threshold
schemes which meet this bound.
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It is interesting to note that Benaloh [1] uses the discrete logarithm to transform Shamir's
scheme, to meet a very di erent purpose. One of the properties of the discrete logarithm
is that the sum of the discrete logarithms of the shares of a secret is equal to the discrete
logarithm of the product of the shares of the secret. This property has an application in secretballot elections (cf. Benaloh [1]) where, in contrast with schemes mentioned above, the discrete
logarithm problem is required to be tractable.
The homomorphic property introduced by Benaloh [1] has prompted the question whether similar
schemes can be set up in non-commutative groups { other than the additive and multiplicative
groups of nite elds. Frankel and Desmedt [44] prove that perfect homomorphic threshold
schemes cannot be set up in non-commutative groups. It is an open problem to nd useful
applications of homomorphic schemes in abelian groups.

0.43.10 Error Correcting Codes and Secret Sharing
McEliece and Sarwate [61] observe that Shamir's scheme is closely related to Reed-Solomon
codes [62]. The advantage of this formulation is that the error correcting capabilities of the
Reed-Solomon codes can be translated into desirable secret sharing properties.
Let ( 0 ; 1; : : :; q 1) be a xed list of the nonzero elements of a nite eld GF (q ) containing q
elements. In a Reed-Solomon code, an information word a = (a0 ; a1; : : :; ak 1), ai 2 GF (q ), is
P
encoded into the codeword D = (D1; D2; : : :; Dr 1), where Di = kj =01 aj i j . In this formulation
Pr 1 D and the shares distributed to the participants are the D .
the secret is a0 =
i
i=1 i
In the above formulation of threshold schemes, algorithms such as the errors-and-erasures decoding algorithm can be used to correct t out of s shares where s 2t  k in a (k; n)-threshold
scheme, if for some reason these shares were corrupted. The algorithm will also locate which
invalid shares Di were submitted, either as a result of deliberate tampering or as a result of
storage degradation.
Karnin et al [54] realize threshold schemes using linear codes. Massey [59] introduced the concept
of minimal codewords, and proved that the access structure of a secret sharing scheme based on
a [n; k] linear code is determined by the minimal codewords of the dual code. To realize a (t; n)threshold scheme, a linear [n +1; t; q ] code C over GF (q ) is selected. If G is the generator matrix
12

of C and s 2 GF (q ) is the secret, then the information vector s = (s0; s1; : : :; st 1 ) is any vector
satisfying s = s  gT , where gT is the rst column vector of G. The codeword corresponding
to s is sG = (t0 ; t1 ; : : :; tn ). Each participant in the scheme receives ti as its share and t0 is
the secret. To recover the secret, rst the linear dependency between g and the other column
P
vectors in the (public) generator matrix G is determined. If g = xj gj is the linear relation,
P
the secret is given by xj tij , where fti ; ti ; : : :; tit g is a set of t shares.
1

2

Renvall and Ding [69] consider the access structures of secret sharing schemes based on linear
codes as used by McEliece and Sarwate and Karnin et al. They determine the access structures
that arise from [n + 1; k; n k + 2] MDS codes { codes which achieve the singleton bound
[62]. Bertilsson and Ingemarsson [8] use linear block codes to realize secret sharing schemes
for general access structures. Their algorithm takes a description of an access structure by a
monotone Boolean formula , and outputs the generator matrix of a linear code which realises
.

0.43.11 Combinatorial structures and secret sharing
There are various connections between combinatorial structures and secret sharing, cf. [9]. Stinson and Vanstone [85], and Schellenberg and Stinson [72] study threshold schemes based on
combinatorial designs. Stinson [84] uses balanced incomplete blocks designs to obtain general
bounds on the information rate  of schemes with access structure based on graphs (cf. 0.43.15).
Street [83] surveys de ning sets for t-designs and critical sets for Latin squares, with the view of
applying these concepts to multilevel secret sharing schemes, in which a hierarchical structure
can be imposed on the shares. To illustrate these methods, we give an example of a (2; 3)threshold scheme based on a small Latin square, cf. Chaudhry and Seberry [31]. For an example
of a scheme with a hierarchical share structure, cf. Street [83].
Let (i; j ; k) denote that the value k is in position (i; j ) of the Latin square
01 2 31
B
C
L=B
B@ 2 3 1 CCA :
3 1 2
The shares of the secret, which is L, are: S = f(2; 1; 1); (3; 2; 1); (1; 3; 3)g.
13

More recently, critical sets in Room squares have been used to realize multilevel secret sharing
schemes, cf. Chaudhry and Seberry [31]. Some other approaches to multilevel schemes are
considered in the papers by: Beutelspacher [11] and Cooper et al [33]. The schemes based on
Latin and Room squares are examples of nonperfect schemes which will be discussed in Section
0.43.17.

0.43.12 The Problem of cheaters
So far we have assumed that the participants in a secret sharing scheme are honest and obey
the reconstruction protocol. However, there are conceivable situations where a dishonest clique
of participants (assuming an honest KDC) may attempt to defraud the honest participants by
altering the shares they were issued.
In the McEliece and Sarwate formulation of Shamir's scheme, invalid shares can be identi ed.
Schemes with this capability are said to have the cheater identi cation property. A weaker
capability ascertains that invalid shares were submitted in the reconstruction phase without
necessarily locating the source of these shares; this is called cheater detection.
Tompa and Woll [87] show that public knowledge of the ordinates in Shamir's scheme allows
a clique of dishonest participants to modify their shares resulting in an invalid secret K 0 being
recreated. Suppose that participants i1; i2; : : :; it agree to pool their shares in order to recreate
the secret. A dishonest participant, say i1, can determine a polynomial (x) of degree at most
t 1 from: (0) = 1 and (i2) = (i3) =    = (it) = 0 using Lagrangian interpolation.
Instead of the share originally issued by the dealer, the cheater submits the modi ed share
a(i1) + (i1). Lagrangian interpolation of points using the modi ed share will result in the
polynomial a(x) + (x) being recreated, instead of the intended polynomial a(x). Now the
constant term is a(0)+(0) = K 1, a legal but incorrect secret. The honest participants believe
that the secret is K 1, but the cheater privately recovers the correct secret as K = (K 1)+1.
To prevent this type of cheating, Tompa and Woll de ne the shares in their scheme as:
(x1; d1); (x2; d2); : : : (xn ; dn ). The dealer chooses randomly and uniformly a permutation
(x1; x2; : : :; xn ) of n distinct elements from f1; 2; : : :; q 1g, and di = a(xi ). The modi ed
scheme resists the above attack for up to t 1 cheaters. The expected running time of the
14

scheme is polynomial in k; n; logs and log(1=), where  is a designated security parameter of
the scheme and the secret k is chosen from f0; 1; : : :; s 1g. But the participants need to keep
secure two shares instead of the usual single share.
Brickell and Stinson [20] modi ed Blakley's geometric (t; n)-scheme and obtainied a scheme
in which cheaters can be detected and identi ed. Blakley et al [13] proved that this scheme is
capable of disenrolling participants; cf. Section 0.43.9. To set up the scheme, the dealer performs
certain computations such as checking that the shadows are in general position. It is an open
problem whether these computations can be done eciently as the numbers of participants
increase.
The problem of secret sharing without the usual assumptions about the honesty of the participants, or even the KDC has been considered in the literature. For example, in veri able secret
sharing it is not assumed that the dealer is honest. This problem is studied by Chor, Goldwasser,
Micali and Awerbuch [32]. The problem is how to convince the participants in a (t; n)-threshold
scheme, that every subset of t shares of a share set fs1 ; s2; : : :; sn g de nes the same secret. This
is called t-consistency. In Shamir's scheme, t-consistency is equivalent to the condition that
interpolation on the points (1; s1); (2; s2); : : :; (n; sn) yields a polynomial of degree at most t 1.
As application of homomorphic schemes, Benaloh [1] gives an interactive proof that Shamir's
scheme is t-consistent.

0.43.13 General access structures
A complete discussion of secret sharing requires the notion of a general access structure.
Ito, Saito and Nishizeki [52] describe a method to realize secret sharing schemes for general
access structures. They observe that for most applications of secret sharing it suces to consider
monotone access structures (MAS), de ned as follows.

De nition 5 Given a set P of n participants (jPj= n), a monotone access structure on P is a
family of subsets A  2P such that
A  A0  P ) A0 2 A
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(4)

The intersubsection A1 \ A2 , and the union A1 [ A2 of two monotone access structures is a
monotone access structure. If A is a monotone access structure, then 2P n A = A is not a
MAS. Any MAS can be expressed equivalently by a monotone Boolean function. Conversely,
any Boolean expression without negations represents a MAS.
In view of the above observations, we consider the minimal authorized subsets of an access
structure A on P . A set B 2 A is minimal authorized, if for each proper subset A of B , it is
the case that A 62 A. The set of minimal authorized subsets of A is called the basis. An access
structure A is the unique closure of the basis, i.e. all subsets of P which are supersets of the
basis elements.
Some examples of inequivalent access structures on four participants are given by the following
monotone formulae: 1 = P1 P2 P3 + P1 P2P4 + P1 P3 P4 + P2 P3 P4 { a (3; 4)-threshold scheme;
2 = P1 P2 +P3 P4 ; 4 = P1 P2 +P2 P3 +P3 P4 . In these formulae, the Pi 's represent the participants
in the scheme (sometimes the literals A; B etc. are used). The authorized subsets in the access
structure are speci ed precisely by these formulae. For example, 2 stipulates that either P1
AND P2 OR P3 AND P4 are the authorized subsets. (It is known that no threshold scheme can
realize the access structure de ned by 2 . For a proof, cf. Benaloh and Leichter [2].)
The inequivalent access structures on three and four participants, and the information rates of
secret sharing schemes realizing these structures are given by Simmons, Jackson and Martin
[80] and by Stinson [84]. The information rates of all inequivalent access structures on ve
participants are discussed by Martin and Jackson [60]. It should be remarked that an exhaustive
examination of access structures is probably limited to ve participants. For more than ve
participants, the number of equivalence classes of monotone Boolean formulae becomes too
great to consider. However, Martin and Jackson [60] provide inductive methods using which the
information rates of an access structure is related to the information rates of smaller access
structures which are `embedded' in .
Secret sharing schemes for non-monotone access structures have also been investigated, cf. Simmons [79].
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0.43.14 Realising general access structures
Ito et al [52] were the rst to show how to realize secret sharing schemes for general access
structures. Benaloh and Leichter [2] simpli ed the method of Ito et al.
They show that any monotone access structure can be recognized by a monotone boolean circuit.
In a monotone circuit, each variable corresponds to an element of P . The circuit outputs a true
value only when the set of variables which take a true value corresponds to an authorized subset
of P , i.e. belongs to the access structure. Monotone circuits are described by Boolean formulae
which involve only AND and OR operators. Using Benaloh and Leichter's method, one can
realise any access structure as a composite of sub-secrets. The sub-secrets are shared across
AND gates by (t; t)-threshold schemes for appropriate t, and all the inputs to the OR gates have
the same value.
Simmons, Jackson and Martin [80] show how cumulative arrays, rst studied by Ito et al [52],
can be used to realize geometric secret sharing schemes for general access structures.

De nition 6 A cumulative array CA = (S ; f )A for the access structure A is a pair comprising
of the share set S = fs1; s2 ; : : :g, and the dealer function f : P ! 2S which assigns subset of
shares to each participant.

As an example, consider the following access structure:

A = closureffP1; P2g; fP2; P3g; fP3; P4g; fP1; P4gg;
where P = fP1 ; P2; P3; P4g. Let S = fs1; s2 g. A cumulative array for this access structure is:
f (P1 ) = s1, f (P2) = s2 , f (P3) = s1 , and f (P4) = s2 .
Perfect geometric secret sharing schemes are obtained from cumulative arrays as follows. Choose
a projective space Vi = PG(m 1; q ), where m is the number of columns in the cumulative array.
In Vi , let fsi ; : : :; sm ; K g be m + 1 points such that no m points lie on a hyperplane of Vi { the
T
points are in general position. A domain variety Vd is chosen so that Vi Vd = fK g. The set of
shares in the geometric scheme is fsi ; : : :; sm g and K is the secret. The shares are distributed
using the cumulative array: participant Pi receives share sj if and only if the (i; j ) entry of the
array is one. Note that, it could be dicult to verify the general position hypothesis for large m,
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cf. Brickell and Stinson [20]. Jackson and Martin [53] show that any geometric secret sharing
scheme realising an access structure is `contained' in the cumulative array which realises the
access structure.
For any access structure A on the set P , there is a unique minimal cumulative array. Thus to
implement geometric secret sharing schemes with the minimal number of shares, we need only
consider minimal cumulative arrays. It remains only to have a means by which the minimal
cumulative array can be calculated given an arbitrary monotone boolean function . Such a
method was rst given by Simmons, Jackson and Martin [80]. It relies on minimizing the boolean
expression which results when the AND and OR operators in are exchanged.
An alternative method for calculating minimal cumulative arrays is described by Charnes and
Pieprzyk [29]. Their method has the advantage that the complete truth table of is not required
for some , thereby avoiding an exponential time computation. For general Boolean expressions,
as the number of variables increases the time complexity of the above method and the method
given by [80] is the same.
To describe the method of Charnes and Pieprzyk [29], we require the following.

De nition 7 ([29]) The representative matrix M of a monotone Boolean function
(P1 ; P2; : : :; Pn ), expressed as a disjunctive sum of r products of n variables, is an n  r matrix
with rows indexed by the Pi and columns by the product terms of the Pi . The (i; j )-entry is one
if Pi occurs in the j -th product, and is zero otherwise.

For example, if = P1 P2 + P2 P3 + P3P4 , then M is the following matrix:

P1P2 P2 P3 P3 P4
P1
P2
P3
P4

1
1
0
0

0
1
1
0

0
0
1
1

Suppose that (P1 ; P2; : : :; Pn) is a monotone formula expressed in minimal disjunctive form,
i.e. a disjunctive sum of products of the Pi and no product term is contained in any other. Let
M be its representative matrix.
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De nition 8 ([29]) A subset fPl; Pm; : : :g of the variables of (P1; P2; : : :; Pn) is a relation set
if Pl Pm    is represented in M by the all ones vector.
In the representative matrix above, fP1 ; P3g, fP2 ; P3g, and fP2; P4g are the minimal representative sets, i.e., not contained in any other representative set. The Boolean formula derived from
these sets is P1 P3 + P2 P3 + P2 P4.

Theorem 2 ([29]) Let (P1; P2; : : :; Pn) be a monotone formula and M its representative matrix. Let R be the collection of minimal relation sets of M . Then the representative matrix
whose rows are indexed by the variables Pi and columns by product terms derived from R is the
minimal cumulative array for A.
Thus, using the above theorem the matrix

P1P3 P2 P3 P2 P4
P1
P2
P3
P4

1
0
1
0

0
1
1
0

0
1
0
1

is the minimal cumulative array for = P1 P2 + P2 P3 + P3 P4. To realize as a geometric scheme,
we require a projective space Vi = PG(2; q ). The secret K 2 Vd , and the shares fs1 ; s2; s3 g are
points chosen in general position in Vi . The cumulative array speci es the distribution of the
shares: P1 receives share fs1g; P2 receives shares fs2 ; s3g; P3 receives shares fs1; s2 g; P4 receives
share fs3 g. It can be easily veri ed that only the authorized subsets of participants can recreate
the secret, e.g. the combined shares of P1 and P2 span Vi, hence these participants can recover
the secret as Vi \ Vd = fK g. But unauthorized participants, e.g. P1 and P3 , cannot recover the
secret.
An algorithm for calculating cumulative arrays, based on Theorem 2, is described by Charnes
and Pieprzyk [29]. This algorithm is ecient for those which have columns containing many
zeros in M . Thus in the previous example, the combinations: fP1 ; P2g, fP1 ; P4g and fP3 ; P4g
cannot produce relation sets and can be ignored. Further computational economy is obtained if
the boolean formula has a large degree of symmetry.
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0.43.15 Ideal and other schemes
Brickell [18] gives a vector space construction for realizing ideal secret sharing schemes for certain
types of access structures, . Let  be a function

 : P [ fDg ! GF (q)d
with the property that (D) can be expressed as a linear combination of the vectors in
< (Pi ) : Pi 2 B > if and only if B is an authorized subset, i.e. B 2 . Then, for any
such , the distribution rules (cf. Section 0.43.2) are: for any vector a = (a1 ; : : :; sd) in GF (q )d ,
a distribution rule is given by the inner product of a and (x) for every x 2 P [ fDg. Under
the above conditions, the collection of distribution rules is an ideal secret sharing scheme for .
A proof of this result can be found in a paper by Stinson [84].
Shamir's (t; n)-threshold scheme is an instance of the vector space construction. Access structures (G), whose basis is the edge set of certain undirected graphs, can also be realized as ideal
schemes by this construction. In particular the access structure (G), where G = (V; E ) is a
complete multigraph can be realized as an ideal scheme. A proof of this is given by Stinson [84].
A relation between ideal secret sharing schemes and matroids was established by Brickell and
Davenport [19]. The matroid theory counterpart of a minimal linearly dependent set of vectors
in a vector space is called a circuit. A coordinatizable matroid is one which can be mapped into
a vector space over a eld in a way that preserves linear independence. Brickell and Davenport
[19] prove the following theorem about coordinatizable matroids.

Theorem 3 ([19]) Suppose the connected matroid M = (X; I ) is coordinatizable over a nite
eld. Let x 2 X and let P = X nfxg. Then there exists an ideal scheme for the connected access
structure having basis 0 = fC n fxg : x 2 C 2 Cg, where C denotes the set of circuits of M.
There are limits to the access structures that can be realized as ideal secret sharing schemes.
This was rst established by Benaloh and Leichter [2]. They proved that the access structure
on four participants speci ed by the monotone formula = P1 P2 + P2 P3 + P3 P4 , cannot be
realised by an ideal scheme. The relation between the size of the shares and the key for was
made precise by Capocelli et al [23]. They prove the following information theoretic bound.
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Theorem 4 For the access structure = closureffP1; P2g; fP2; P3g; fP3; P4gg on four participants fP1 ; P2; P3; P4g, the inequality H (P2) + H (P3)  3H (K ) holds for any secret sharing
scheme realizing .

From this theorem it follows that the information rate  of any secret sharing scheme realizing
satis es the bound   23 . Bounds are also derived by Capocelli et al [23] for the maximum
information rate  of access structures (G), where the graph G is: a path Pn (n  3); a cycle
Cn, n  6, for n even and n  5, for n odd; or any tree Tn .

0.43.16 Realising schemes eciently
In view of bounds on the information rates of secret sharing schemes, it is natural to ask
whether there exist schemes whose information rates equal the known bounds. For example, for
= P1 P2 + P2 P3 + P3 P4 one is interested in realizations of with  = 32 .
Stinson [84] used a general method, called decomposition construction, to build larger schemes
starting from smaller ideal schemes. In this method, the basis 0 of an access structure is
decomposed into smaller access structures, as: 0 = [ k , where the k are the basis of the
constituent access structures which can be realized as ideal schemes. From such decompositions
of access structures, Stinson [84] derives a lower bound: ( )  `=R, where ` and R are two
quantities de ned in terms of the ideal decomposition of 0 . The decomposition construction and
its precursor, the graph decomposition construction (cf. Blundo et al. [15]), can be formulated
as linear programming problems in order to derive the best possible information rates that are
obtainable using these constructions.
Other ways of realizing schemes with optimal or close to optimal information rates are considered
by Charnes and Pieprzyk [30]. Their method combines multiple copies of cumulative arrays using
the notion of composite shares { combinations of the ordinary shares in cumulative arrays. This
procedure is stated as an algorithm which outputs a cumulative array with the best information
rate. It is not clear how ecient this algorithm is as the numbers of participants increases.
However, the optimal information rates for access structures on four participants given by Stinson
[84] can be attained by combining cumulative arrays.
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0.43.17 Nonperfect schemes
It is known that in nonperfect schemes the size of the shares is less that the size of the secret,
i.e. H (si) < H (K ). Because of this inequality, a nonperfect scheme can be used to disperse a
computer le to n sites, in such a way that the le can be recovered from its images which are
held at any t of the sites (t  n). Moreover, this can be done so that the size of the images
is less than the size of the original le, resulting in an obvious saving of disk space. Making
backups of computer les using this method provides insurance against the loss or destruction
of valuable data. For details, cf. Karnin et al [54].
A formal analysis of nonperfect secret sharing schemes is given by Ogata, Kurosawa and Tsujii
[66]. Their analysis characterizes, using information theory, secret sharing schemes in which the
participants not belonging to an access structure do gain some information about the secret.
This condition is precluded in perfect secret sharing schemes.
Ogata et al [66] de ne a nonperfect scheme in terms of a triple of access sets ( 1 ; 2 ; 3), which
partition the set of all subsets of the participants P . 1 is the family of access subsets, 2 is
the family of semi-access subsets and 3 is the family of non-access subsets. The participants
belonging to the semi-access subsets are able to obtain some, but not complete information
about the secret. The participants which belong to the non-access subsets gain no information
about the secret.
The ramp schemes of Blakley and Meadows [14] are examples of nonperfect schemes where
the access structure consists of semi-access subsets. Another way of viewing ramp schemes is
that the collective uncertainty about a secret gradually decreases as more participants join the
collective.
Ogata et al [66] prove a lower bound on the size of the shares in nonperfect schemes. They also
characterize nonperfect schemes for which the size of the shares is jK j=2.
Ogata and Kurosawa [65] establish a general lower bound for the sizes of shares in nonperfect
schemes. They show that there is an access hierarchy for which the size of the shares is strictly
larger than this bound. It is in general a dicult problem to realize nonperfect secret sharing
schemes with the optimum share size, as in the case of perfect schemes.
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0.44 THRESHOLD CRYPTOGRAPHY
There are circumstances where an action requires to be executed by a group of people. For
example, to transfer money from a bank a manager and clerk need to concur. A bank vault
can be opened only if three high ranking bank employees co-operate. A ballistic missile can be
launched if two ocers authorize the action.
Democratic groups usually exhibit a at relational structure where every member has equal
rights. On the other hand, in hierarchical groups, the privileges of group members depend on
their position in the hierarchy. A member on the level i 1 inherits all the privileges from the
level i, as well as additional privileges speci c to its position.
Unlike single user cryptography, threshold or society-oriented cryptography allows groups to
perform cryptographic operations such as encryption, decryption, signature, etc. A trivial implementation of group-oriented cryptography can be achieved by concatenating secret sharing
schemes and a single user cryptosystem. This arrangement is usually unacceptable as the cooperating subgroup must rst recover the cryptographic key. Having access to the key can
compromise the system, as its use is not con ned to the requested operation. Ideally, the cooperating participants should perform their private computations in one go. Their partial results
are then sent to a so-called combiner who calculates the nal result. Note that at no point is
the secret key exposed.
A group-oriented cryptosystem is usually set up by a dealer who is a trusted authority. The
dealer generates all the parameters, distributes elements via secure channels if the elements
are secret or broadcasts the parameters if they need not be protected. After setting up a
group cryptosystem, the dealer is no longer required, as all the necessary information has been
deposited with the participants of the group cryptosystem.
If some participants want to cooperate to perform a cryptographic operation, they use a combiner
to perform the nal computations on behalf of the group. The nal result is always correct if the
participants belong to the access structure and follow the steps of the algorithm. The combiner
fails if the participants do not belong to the access structure, or if the participants do not follow
the algorithm (that is, they cheat). The combiner need not be trusted; it suces to assume that
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it will perform some computations reliably but not necessarily all.
The access structure is the collection of all subsets of participants authorized to perform an
action. An example is a (t; n)-threshold scheme, where any t out of n participants are authorized
subsets (t  n).
Threshold cryptography provides tools for groups to perform:

 threshold encryption { a group generates a valid cryptogram which can later be decrypted
by a single receiver;

 threshold decryption { a single sender generates a valid cryptogram which can be decrypted
by a group;

 threshold authentication { a group of senders agrees to co-authenticate the message so the
receiver can decide whether the message is authentic or not;

 threshold signature (multisignature) { a group signs a message which is later validated by
a single veri er;

 threshold pseudorandom generation.

0.44.1 Threshold encryption
Public-key cryptography can be used as a basis for simple group encryption. Assume that a
receiver wants to have a communication channel from a group of n participants P = fP1 ; : : :; Pn g.
Further suppose that the receiver can decrypt a cryptogram only if all participants co-operate
{ i.e. a (n; n)-threshold encryption system. Group encryption works as follows.
Assume that the group and the receiver agree to use the RSA cryptosystem with the modulus
N = pq . The receiver rst computes a pair of keys: one for encryption e and the other for
decryption d, where e  d  1 mod (p 1)(q 1). Both keys are secret. The factors p and q
are known by the receiver only. The encryption key is communicated to the dealer (via a secure
channel). The dealer selects n 1 shares ei of the encryption key at random from the interval
[0; e=n]. The last share is
nX1
en = e
ei :
i=1
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Each share ei is communicated to participant Pi via a secure channel (i = 1; : : :; n).
Now if the group wants to send a message m to the receiver, each participant Pi prepares its
partial cryptogram ci  mei mod N (i = 1; : : :; n). After collecting n partial cryptograms, the
Q
receiver can recover the message m  ( ni=1 ci)d mod N . Note that the receiver also plays the
role of a combiner. Moreover, the participants need not reconstruct the secret encryption key e
and at no stage of decryption is the encryption key revealed { this is a characteristic feature of
threshold cryptography.
Many existing secret-key algorithms such as: the DES [64], LOKI [22], FEAL [76], or the Russian
GOST [82], are not homomorphic. These algorithms cannot be used for threshold encryption.
The homomorphic property is necessary in order to generate shares of the key so that partial
cryptograms can be combined into a cryptogram for the correct message, cf. [1].
Threshold encryption has not received a great deal of attention, perhaps because of its limited
practical signi cance.

0.44.2 Threshold decryption
Hwang [49] proposes a cryptosystem for group decryption based on the discrete logarithm problem. In his system it is assumed that the sender knows the participants of the group. The sender
encrypts the message using a predetermined (either private or public key) cryptosystem with a
secret key known to the sender only. The sender then distributes the secret key among the group
of intended receivers using Shamir's (t; n)-threshold scheme. Any t co-operating participants can
recover the decryption key and decrypt the cryptogram. In Hwang's scheme, key distribution is
based on the Die-Hellman [39] protocol. Thus the security of his scheme is equivalent to the
security of the discrete logarithm problem. However, the main problem with the above solution
is that the key can be recovered by a straightforward application of secret sharing. This violates
the fundamental requirement that the decryption key must never be revealed to the group (or
combiner).
We consider now an implementation of a scheme for (t; n)-threshold decryption. The group
decryption used here is based on the ElGamal public-key cryptosystem [41] and is described by
Desmedt and Frankel [35].
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The system is set up by the dealer D who rst chooses a Galois eld GF (q ) such that q 1 is
a Mersenne prime and q = 2` . Further D selects a primitive element g 2 GF (q ) and a nonzero
random integer s 2 GF (q ). The dealer computes y = g s mod q and publishes the triple (g , q , y )
as the public parameters of the system. The dealer then uses Shamir's (t; n)-threshold scheme
to distribute the secret s among the n shareholders in such a way that for any subset B of t
P
participants, the secret s = Pi 2B si mod (q 1) (all calculations are performed in GF (q )).
Suppose that user A wants to send a message m 2 GF (q ) to the group. A rst chooses at
random an integer k 2 GF (q ) and computes the cryptogram c = (g k ; my k ) for the message m.
Assume that B is an authorized subset, so it contains at least t participants. The rst stage
of decryption is executed separately by each participant Pi 2 B. Pi takes the rst part of
the cryptogram and computes (g k )si mod q . The result is sent to the combiner, who computes
yk = g ks = Qi2B g ksi , and decrypts (using the multiplicative inverse y k ) the cryptogram

m  my k  y k mod p:
Group decryption can also be based on a combination of the RSA cryptosystem [70] and Shamir's
threshold scheme. The scheme described by Desmedt and Frankel [36] works as follows. The
dealer D computes the modulus N = pq , where p, q are strong primes, that is, p = 2p0 + 1 and
q = 2q 0 + 1 (where p0 and q 0 are large and distinct primes). The dealer selects at random an
integer e such that e and (N ) are coprime ((N ) is the least common multiple of two integers
p 1 and q 1, so (N ) = 2p0q 0). Next D publishes e and N as the public parameters of the
system, but keeps p, q , and d secret (d satis es the congruence ed = 1 mod (N )). It is clear
that computing d is easy for the dealer who knows (N ), but is dicult { equivalent to the
factoring of N { to someone who does not know (N ). The dealer then uses Shamir's scheme
to distribute the secret s = d 1 amongst n participants. The shares are denoted si and any t
co-operating participants (the set B) can retrieve the secret. We have,

s=

X
i2B

si mod (N ):

Group decryption of the cryptogram c  me mod N starts from individual computations. Each
Pi 2 B calculates its partial cryptogram csi mod N . All the partial cryptograms are sent to the
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combiner who recovers the message

m=

Y

i2B

csi  c  c(

P

i2B si +1)

 cd  (me)d mod N:

Again the secret s = d 1 is never exposed during the decryption.
Ghodosi, Pieprzyk and Safavi-Naini [46] given a solution to the problem of group decryption
which does not require a dealer. It uses the RSA cryptosystem and Shamir's threshold scheme.
The system works under the assumption that all participants from P = fP1; : : :; Pn g have their
entries in a public registry (white pages). The registry provides the public parameters of a given
participant. A participant Pi has as its RSA entry Ni; ei in the registry, and this entry cannot
be modi ed by an unauthorized person.

Q
The sender rst selects the group P = fP1 ; : : :; Pn g. For the message m (0 < m < ni=1 Ni),
the sender computes
mi  m mod Ni
for i = 1; : : :; n. Next the sender selects at random a polynomial f (x) of degree at most t over
GF (p), where p < mini Ni. Let

f (x) = a0 + a1 x + : : : + at 1 xt

1

The sender computes ci = f (xi) for public xi , k = f (0), cei i mod Ni, and mki mod Ni (i =
1; : : :; n). Finally, the sender merges cei i mod Ni into C1 and mki mod Ni into C2 using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. The sender broadcasts the tuple (N; p; t; C1; C2) as the cryptogram.
The participants check whether they are the intended recipients, by nding the gcd (Ni; N )
for instance. Note that the sender can give the list of all participants instead of the modulus
N . A participant Pi rst recovers the pair (cei i mod Ni ) and (mki mod Ni ) from C1 and C2,
respectively. Using its secret key di , the participant retrieves ci . The ci are now broadcast so
that each participant can reconstruct f (x) and nd k = f (0). Note that none of the participants
can cheat, as it can be readily veri ed whether c0i satis es the congruence

c0ei i  C1 mod Ni :
Knowing k, each participant nds the message mi  C2k mod Ni . Although k is public, only
participant Pi can nd k 1  k mod (pi 1)(qi 1) from his knowledge of the factorization of
1
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Ni = piqi . Lastly, all the partial messages are communicated to the combiner who recovers the
message m by the Chinese Remainder Theorem.

0.45 SIGNATURE SCHEMES
A signature scheme consists of two algorithms: signature generation and signature veri cation.
Each of these algorithms can be collaboratively performed. A shared-generation scheme allows
a group of signers to collaboratively sign a document. In a signature scheme with shared
veri cation, the signature veri cation requires collaboration of a group. We examine the two
types of systems and note that the two can be combined if necessary.

0.45.1 Shared generation schemes
In these schemes a signer group P of n participants has a public/private key pair. The private
part is shared among members of the group such that each member has part of the private key
which is not known to anyone else. The signature scheme is usually based on one of the well
known signature schemes such as ElGamal, Schnorr, RSA and Fiat-Shamir.
The group is created with an access structure that determines the authorized groups of signers.
A special case of shared-generation schemes are multisignature schemes, in which collaboration
of all members in P is necessary. Most systems proposed for shared generation are of the multisignature type, or its generalization, (t; n)-threshold signature. In the latter type of signature
each subgroup p, p  P of size t, can generate the signature.
A shared-generation scheme can be sequential or simultaneous. In a sequential scheme each
member of the group signs the message and forwards it to the next group member. In some
schemes, after the rst signer the message is not readable and all subsequent signers must blindly
sign the message. In a simultaneous scheme, each group member forms a partial signature which
is sent to a combiner who forms the nal signature.
There are a number of issues that di erentiate shared-generation systems.
1. Mutually trusted party: a system may need a mutually trusted party who is usually active
during the key generation phase; it chooses the group secret key and generates secrets for
28

all group members. In systems without a trusted party, each signer produces his secret
key and participates in a protocol with other signers to generate the group public key.
2. The security of most signatures schemes is based on the intractability of one of the following
problems: discrete logarithm or integer factorization. Shared-generation schemes based on
ElGamal and Schnorr signature schemes use the former, while those based on RSA and
Fiat-Shamir use the later.
3. Using many/few interactions for producing signature. The amount of interaction between
the signers and the trusted third party varies in di erent schemes.
There are properties { some essential and some desirable { that a shared-generation scheme
must satisfy. The essential properties are:
A1 Signature generation must require collaboration of all members of the authorized group
and no signer in the group should be able to deny his signature. Veri cation must be
possible by any outsider.
A2 An unauthorized group should not be able to forge the signature of an authorized group.
It should not also be possible for an authorized group to forge the signature of another
authorized group.
A3 No secret information should be derivable from the released group and partial signatures.
The desirable properties are:
1. Each signer must have the same power and be able to see the message that he is signing.
2. The order of signing in a sequential scheme should not be xed.
3. The size of the multisignature should be comparable, preferably the same, as the size of
the individual signature.
For a (t; n) threshold signature scheme (A1) and (A2) reduce to:
B1 From any t partial signature the group signature should be easily derivable.
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B2 Knowledge of t 1 or fewer partial signatures should not reduce the chance of forgery of
an unauthorized group.

0.45.2 Constructions
The earliest proposals for shared-generation schemes are by Itakura [51] and by Boyd [16].
Boyd's scheme is a (n; n)-threshold group signature based on RSA, in which if n > 2, most
participants must blindly sign the message.

0.45.3 f Threshold RSA signature
Desmedt and Frankel [36] construct a simultaneous threshold (t; n) RSA signature which requires
a trusted third party to generate and distribute the group public key and the secret keys of the
signers.
Their scheme works as follows. In the initialization stage, a trusted KDC (dealer) selects at
random a polynomial of degree t 1: f (x) = a0 + a1 x + a2 x2 +    + at 1 xt 1 . The group secret
key k is xed as a0 = f (0). The dealer gives yi = f (xi ) to participant Pi , for each i, via a secure
channel. The computations are performed in Z(N ), where  = 2p0q 0 and p = 2p0 +1; q = 2q 0 +1.
To sign a message m (0  m < N ) each participant Pi 2 B , calculates its partial signature
si = mki mod N and transmits the result to the combiner. The combiner computes the signature
S of the message m according to the following:

S = m

Y
Pi 2B

si = m 

Yt
Pi 2B

mki = m  md 1 = md mod N

i=1

The signature veri cation is similar to the conventional RSA signature scheme.

0.45.4 g Threshold signature based on discrete logarithm
Ohta and Okamoto [67] propose a sequential multisignature scheme based on the Fiat-Shamir
signature scheme. In their scheme, the order of signing is not restricted but the scheme requires
a trusted center for key generation.
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A variation of group signature is undeniable group signature, in which veri cation requires collaboration of signers. The signature scheme has a `commitment phase' during which t group
members work together to sign a message. And a `veri cation phase' during which all signers
work together to prove validity of the signature to an outsider. Harn and Yang [48] propose two
(t; n)-threshold schemes, with t = 1 and t = n. Their schemes do not require a trusted third
party and the algorithm is based on the discrete logarithm problem.
Harn [47] proposes three simultaneous multisignature schemes, based on the diculty of discrete
logarithm. Two of these schemes do not require a trusted third party. We brie y review one of
the schemes. of these schemes. We use the notation of Harn [47].
Let KDC denote the Key Distribution Center. The KDC selects:
1. p, a large prime, in the range 2511  p  2512
2. q , a prime divisor of p 1
3. fai; i = 0; : : :; t 1g, and f (x) = a0 + a1x +    + at 1 xt
4. , where = h(p 1)=q (mod p) > 1.
are made public.

1

(mod q ) where 0 < ai < q

is a generator with order q in GF(p). p, q and

The KDC computes the group public key y = f (0) mod p, where f (0) is the group secret key.
The KDC also computes public keys for all group members as:

yi =

f (xi )

(mod p);

for i = 1; 2; : : :; n

where f (xi ) mod q is the share of participant i from the group secret key. (Note that, since is
a generator with order q in GF (p), r mod p = r mod q , for any nonnegative integer r.)
In order to generate the group signature on a message m, each participant of a group B (jB j  t)
randomly selects an integer, ki 2 [1; q 1], and computes a public value, ri = ki mod p and
broadcasts ri to all members in B . Knowing all the ri (i 2 B ), each member of the group B
computes,
Y
r = ri (mod p)
i2B
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Participant i computes his partial signature as

0
BY
si = m0  f (xi )  B
@

1
xj C
CA ki  r (mod p)
(
x
x
)
i
j
i;j2B
i6=j

where H (m) = m0 (H is a one-way and collision free hash function) and transmits (ri; si ) to a
designated combiner.
Once the combiner receives the partial signature (ri ; si), it is veri ed using
0

yi(m )

Q

xj
i;j2B (xi xj ) )
i6=j

(

= si rir (mod p)

If all the partial signatures are veri ed, then the combiner calculates the group signature (r; s)
P
on message m, where s = i2B si (mod q ).
An outsider who receives the signature (r; s) on the message m can verify the validity of the
signature using the check y m0 = s rr (mod p). This check works because

f (0) =
and thus,

ym0 = (

f (0))m0

=(

P

X
i2B

f (xi)

Y
i;j2B

i6=j

xj

(xi xj ) (mod q )

Q

( i2B f (xi) i;j2B (xixjxj ) )m0
i6=j

=

Y
i2B

0

Q

(

yi(m )

xj
i;j2B (xi xj ) )
i6=j

=

Y
i2B

(rir asi ) = rr s

An interesting security problem in these schemes, as discussed by Desmedt and Frankel [36] and
by Harn [47], is that if more than t signers collaborate they can nd the secrets of the system
with a high probability, and thus identify the rest of the shareholders. Possible solutions to this
problem in the case of discrete logarithm based schemes can be found in a paper by Li, Hwang
and Lee [57].
A concept related to threshold signature is t-resilient digital signatures. In these schemes, n
members of a group can collaboratively sign a message even if there are t dishonest members.
Moreover no subset of t dishonest members can forge a signature.
Desmedt [34] shows that a t-resilient signature scheme with no trusted center can be constructed
for any signature scheme using a general multiparty protocol. Cerecedo, Matsumoto and Imai
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[24] present ecient protocols for the shared generation of signatures based on the discrete
logarithm problem, Schnorr's scheme and variants of the ElGamal scheme. Their protocols are
based on an ecient multiparty protocol for shared computation of products and they do not
need a trusted party. Park and Kurosawa [68] discuss a (t; n)-threshold scheme based on the
discrete logarithm, more precisely a version of Digital Signature Standard (DSS), which does
not require multiplication and only uses linear combination for combination of shares.
Chang and Liou [25], and Langford [56] propose other signature schemes based on the discrete
logarithm problem.

0.45.5 Shared veri cation of signatures
Signature schemes with shared veri cation are not commonly found in in literature.
Soete, Quisquater and Vedder [81] propose a system for shared veri cation of signatures. But
their system is not really a signature scheme in the sense that it does not produce a signature for
every message. Each user has a secret that enables him to verify himself to others. It requires
at least two veri ers for the secret to be veri ed.
Laih and Yen [55] argue that in some cases it might be necessary to sign a message such that
only speci ed groups of participants can verify the signed message. The main requirements of
such schemes are:
1. A can sign any message M for any speci ed group B .
2. Only the speci ed group can validate the signature of A. No other group, except B , can
validate the signature of A on M .
3. B should not be able to forge A's signature on M for another user C even if B and C
conspire.
4. No one should be able to forge A's signature on another message M 0.
5. If A disavows his signature, it must be possible for a third party to resolve the dispute
between A and B .
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The scheme proposed by Laih and Yen [55] is based on Harn's scheme, which is an ecient
ElGamal type shared-generation scheme. In the proposed scheme a group of signers can create
a digital shared-generation scheme for a speci ed group, who can collectively check the validity
of the signature. The secret key of the users is chosen by the users themselves and each group
has a public key for signature generation or veri cation. Since the private key of the veri ers
is not known, dispute settlement by a third party requires an extra protocol between the third
party and the veri ers.

0.46 QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION - QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
While classical cryptography employs various mathematical techniques to restrict eavesdroppers
from learning the contents of encrypted messages, in quantum mechanics the information is
protected by the laws of physics. In classical cryptography absolute security of information
cannot be guaranteed. However on the quantum level there is a law called the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle. This states that even the most re ned measurement on a quantum object
cannot reveal everything about the object before the measurement was made. This is because
the object may be altered by simply taking the measurement. The Heisenberg uncertainty
principle and quantum entanglement can be exploited in a system of secure communication,
often referred to as `quantum cryptography' [6]. Quantum cryptography provides means for
two parties to exchange a enciphering key over a private channel with complete security of
communication.
There are at least three main types of quantum cryptosystems for the key distribution, these
are:

 BB protocol: Cryptosystems with encoding based on two non-commuting observables proposed by Wiesner (1970), and by Bennett and Brassard (1984) [89].

 EPR-type: Cryptosystems with encoding built upon quantum entanglement and the Bell
Theorem proposed by Ekert (1990) [42].

 B-type: Cryptosystems with encoding based on two non-orthogonal state vectors proposed
by Bennett (1992) [3].
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A BB quantum cryptosystem can be explained using the following simple example. The system
includes a transmitter, Alice, and a receiver, Bob. Alice may use the transmitter to send photons
in one of four polarisations: 0, 45, 90, or 135 degrees. Bob at the other end uses the receiver
to measure the polarisation. According to the laws of quantum mechanics, Bob's receiver can
distinguish between rectilinear polarisations (0 and 90), or it can quickly be recon gured to
discriminate between diagonal polarisations (45 and 135); it can never, however, distinguish
both types. The key distribution requires several steps. Alice sends photons with one of the
four polarisations which are chosen at random. For each incoming photon, Bob chooses at
random the type of measurement: either the rectilinear type or the diagonal type. Bob records
the results of the measurements but keeps them secret. Subsequently Bob publicly announces the
type of measurement (but not the results) and Alice tells the receiver which measurements were
of the correct type. Alice and Bob (the sender and the receiver) keep all cases in which Bob's
measurements were of the correct type. These cases are then translated into bits (1's and 0's)
and thereby become the key. An eavesdropper is bound to introduce errors to this transmission
because he/she does not know in advance the type of polarisation of each photon and quantum
mechanics does not allow him/her to acquire sharp values of two non-commuting observables
(here rectilinear and diagonal polarisations). The two legitimate users of the quantum channel,
Alice and Bob, test for eavesdropping by revealing a random subset of the key bits and checking
(in public) the error rate. Although they cannot prevent eavesdropping, they will never be fooled
by an eavesdropper because any, however subtle and sophisticated, e ort to tap the channel will
be detected. Whenever they are not happy with the security of the channel they can try to set
up the key distribution again. The mechanism of privacy ampli cation is used to nally distill a
secret key between Alice and Bob from these interactions, cf. Bennett, Brassard and Robert [7].
The basic idea of cryptosystems of EPR-type is as follows. A sequence of correlated particle
pairs is generated, with one member of each pair being detected by Alice and the other by
Bob (for example, a pair of so-called Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen photons, whose polarisations are
measured by Alice and Bob). An eavesdropper on this communication would have to detect a
particle to read the signal, and retransmit it in order for his/her presence to remain unknown.
However, the act of detection of one particle of a pair destroys its quantum correlation with the
other. Thus Alice and Bob can easily verify whether this has been done, without revealing the
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results of their own measurements, by communication over an open channel.
In our example we will consider two types of measurement: we consider n and = to be one type
(diagonal) and j and to be the other (rectilinear).
1. Alice's polarisation
2. Bits Alice sent

j

n

0

0

1

j

=

0

0

n
1

1

1

0

1

/
1

3. Bob's polarisation
j n j n j j / j
n
4. Bits Bob registered
0
0 1 1 0 1 0 1
0
1 1
5. Alice states publicly
whether Bob's
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
polarisation was
correct or not
6. Alice's remaining bits 0
0 1 x x 1 x 1
0
1 x
7. Bob's remaining bits
0
0 1 x x 1 x 1
0
1 x
x means discard
8. Alice and Bob
0
0 1 x x 1 x 1
0
1 x
compare bits
0
0 1 x x 1 x 1
0
1 x
chosen at random
OK
OK
OK
9. Alice's remaining bits x 0 1 x x 1 x x
0 x x
10. Bob's remaining bits x
0 1 x x 1 x x
0 x x
11. The key
0 1
1
0

0.46.1 Shor's quantum factoring algorithm
Mathematicians have tried hard to solve the key distribution problem and in the 1970s a clever
mathematical discovery called `public key' systems gave an elegant solution. Public-key cryptosystems avoid the key distribution problem but unfortunately their security depends on unproven mathematical assumptions, such as the diculty of factoring large integers (RSA - the
most popular public key cryptosystem gets its security from the diculty of factoring large num36

bers). An enemy who knows your public key can in principle calculate your private key because
the two keys are mathematically related; however, the diculty of computing the private key
from the respective public key is exactly that of factoring big integers.
Diculty of factoring grows rapidly with the size, i.e. number of digits, of the number we want
to factor. To see this, take a number N with ` decimal digits (N  10` ) and try to factor it
p
by dividing it by 2; 3;    ; N and checking the remainder. In the worst case approximately
p
N  10`=2 divisions may be needed to solve the problem - an exponential increase as a function
of `. Now imagine a computer capable of performing 1010 divisions per second. The computer
p
can then factor any number N , using the trial division method, in about N=1010 seconds.
Take a 100-digit number N , so that N  10100. The computer will factor this number in about
1040 seconds, much longer than 1017 seconds - the estimated age of the universe!
It seems that factoring big numbers will remain beyond the capabilities of any realistic computing
devices and unless mathematicians or computer scientists come up with an ecient factoring
algorithm public-key cryptosystems will remain secure. Or will they? As it turns out we
know that this is not the case; the classical, purely mathematical, theory of computation is not
complete simply because it does not describe all physically possible computations. In particular
it does not describe computations which can be performed by quantum devices. Indeed, recent
work in quantum computation shows that a quantum computer can factor much faster than any
classical computer.
Quantum computers can compute faster because they can accept as input not just one number,
but a coherent superposition of many di erent numbers, and subsequently perform a computation (a sequence of unitary operations) on all of these numbers simultaneously. This can be
viewed as a massive parallel computation, but instead of having many processors working in
parallel we have only one quantum processor performing a computation that a ects all components of the state vector. To see how it works let us describe Shor's factoring using a quantum
computer composed of two quantum registers.
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FACTORING
Quantum factoring of an integer N is based on calculating the period of the
function FN (x) = ax (mod N ). We form the increasing powers of a until they
start to repeat with a period we denote r. Once r is known the factors of N can
be found using the Euclidean algorithm to nd the greatest common divisor of
ar=2  1 and N .
Suppose we want to factor 91. Let us take a number at random, say 28, and raise
it to the powers 2; 3;   . After 12 iterations we nd we have the number 28
repeated and so we use r = 12. Hence we want to nd gcd(91; 286  1), which
we nd to be 1 and 13 respectively. From here we can factorize 91. Classically,
calculating r is as dicult as trying to factor N and the execution time is exponential in the number of digits in N . Quantum computers can nd r in time
which grows only as a quadratic function of the number of digits of N .

Consider two quantum registers, each register being composed of a certain number of two-state
quantum systems which we call `qubits' (quantum bits). We take the rst register and place it
in a quantum superposition of all the possible integer numbers it can contain. This can be done
by starting with all qubits in the 0 states and applying a simple unitary transformation to each
qubit which creates a superposition of 0 and 1 states:

j0i ! p12 (j0i + j1i)

(5)

Imagine a two-qubit register, for example. After this procedure the register will be in a superposition of all four numbers it can contain,

p1 (j0i + j1i) p1 (j0i + j1i) = 12 (j00i + j01i + j10i + j11i)
2
2

(6)

where 00 is binary for 0, 01 binary for 1, 10 binary for 2 and nally 11 which is binary for 3.
Then we perform an arithmetical operation that takes advantage of quantum parallelism by
computing the function FN (x) for each number x in the superposition. The values of FN (x) are
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placed in the second register so that after the computation the two registers become entangled:

X
x

jxijFN (x)i

(7)

(we have ignored the normalization constant). Now we perform a measurement on the second
register. The measurement yields a randomly selected value FN (k) for some k. The state
of the rst register immediately after the measurement, due to the periodicity of FN (k), is a
coherent superposition of all states jxi such that x = k; k + r; k + 2r;   , i.e. all x for which
FN (x) = FN (k). The value k is randomly selected by the measurement: therefore, the state of
the rst register is subsequently transformed via a unitary operation which sets any k to 0 (i.e.
jki becomes j0i plus a phase factor) and modi es the period from r to a multiple of 1=r. This
operation is known as the quantum Fourier transform. The rst register is then ready for the
nal measurement and yields an integer which is the best whole approximation of a multiple of
1=r. From this result r, and subsequently factors of N , can be easily calculated (see the Box).
The execution time of the quantum factoring algorithm can be estimated to grow as a quadratic
function of `, and numbers 100 decimal digits long can be factored in a fraction of a second!
When the rst quantum factoring devices are built, the security of public-key cryptosystems will
vanish. The mathematical solution to the key distribution problem is shattered by the power of
quantum computation. Does it leave us without any means to protect our privacy ? Fortunately
quantum mechanics after destroying classical ciphers comes to rescue our privacy and o ers its
own solution to the key distribution problem.
The main reference for this brief account of quantum cryptanalysis is the paper by Shor [77].
A comprehensive exposition of Shor's algorithm for factoring on a quantum computer, together
with some relevant background in number theory, computational complexity theory and quantum
computation including remarks about possible experimental realizations has been prepared for
the Review of Modern Physics by Artur Ekert and Richard Jozsa and can be obtained via
electronic (postscript le) or postal service.
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0.46.2 Practicalities
The idea of a quantum computer is simple, however its realization is not. Quantum computers
require a coherent, controlled evolution for a period of time which is necessary to complete the
computation. Many view this requirement as an insurmountable experimental problem, however,
others believe that technological progress will sooner or later make such devices feasible. In an
ordinary, classical computer, all the bits have a de nite state at a given instant in time, say
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0   . However in a quantum computer the state of the bits is described by a
wave equation such as
= aj0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1   i + bj1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1   i

(8)

The coecients a, b;    are complex numbers and the probability that the computer is in state
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1    is jaj2, that it is in the state 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1    is jbj2, and so on.
However, describing the state of the computer by a wave function does not merely imply the
ordinary uncertainties that we describe using probabilities. For instance, the phases of the
complex coecients a, b;    have genuine signi cance: they can describe interference between
di erent states of the computer, which is very useful for quantum computation. The quantum
wave function declares that the computer exists in all of its states simultaneously so long as that
state is not measured; when we do choose to measure it, a particular state will be observed with
the prescribed probability.
DiVincenzo [40] shows how to construct the quantum analogue of the one-bit NOT, or inverter
gate, with spectroscopic techniques that have been well known in Physics for over 50 years. He
then shows that the 1956 Feher procedure for polarisation transfer in electron-nucleus double
resolution has the protocol for making the two-qubit (quantum bit) XOR gate implicit within
it. Finally he shows how the three-qubit AND operation can be performed using three XOR
gates and four single-qubit rotations.
In practice we do not know how to `wire up' the components of the XOR gates and so a quantum
computer is still just a theoretical possibility. However if a quantum computer could be built it
would be the end of classical cryptography as we know it.
The eld of quantum cryptography was pioneered by Stephen Wiesner [89]. Around 1970 at
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Columbia University in New York he showed how quantum e ects could in theory be use to produce `quantum bank notes' that are immune to counterfeiting. The rst feasible cryptosystems
were designed between 1982 and 1984 by the American physicist Charles H. Bennett of IBM's
Thomas J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown Heights in the US and by the Canadian expert
in cryptography, Gilles Brassard from the University of Montreal [5]. In 1989 David Deutsch
and Artur Ekert [37, 38] at Oxford University developed the idea along slightly di erent lines.
Their system is based on another aspect of quantum theory called quantum correlation.
In the early 1980s, secure quantum key distribution based on both the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle and quantum correlations evolved into a testable system for practical use, though this
is by no means easy to set up. The rst apparatus, constructed by Bennett, Brassard and
colleagues in 1989 [4] at IBM's research center, was capable of transmitting a secret key over a
distance of approximately 30 centimeters.
Since then, other researchers have looked at systems based on correlations of another quantum
property of light, called phase. Phase is a measure of how far a photon has gone in its cycle of
vibration. Information about the key is encoded in this property of phase instead of polarisation.
This has the advantage that with current technology, phase is easier to handle over a long
distance. Since 1991 John Rarity and Paul Tapster of Britain's [86, 88, 43] Defence Research
Agency in Malvern have been developing a system to increase the transmission distance. They
have designed and tested an optical system good enough to transmit photons that stay correlated
in phase over several hundred meters. Rarity and Tapster believe the distances could increase
to several kilometers, once advances in technology give new optical bers and semiconductor
photo detectors which allow better transmission and detection, and thereby reduce background
errors.
In theory, cryptosystems based on quantum correlations should also allow quantum keys to be
stored, by storing photons without performing any measurements. At present, however, photons
cannot be kept correlated longer than a small fraction of a second, so they are not a good medium
for information storage. But a fraction of a second is long enough for a photon to cover a long
distance, so photons are suitable for sending information and for key distribution.

41

0.47 Research Issues and Summary
In this chapter we discussed: Secret Sharing, Threshold Cryptography, Signature Schemes, and
nally Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Cryptography. As in the previous chapter, we
have focussed only on the essentials. Supplanting this with the bibliography which expands our
exposition by listing items which prepresent the current research activity in these topics. We
give a brief summary of our exposition.
The central problem in secret sharing is how to distribute parts of a secret, to a group individuals,
in such a way that only the pre-designated individuals can recreate the secret. As well as having
direct application in key management, secret sharing schemes are also components of other
cryptographic constructions.
Threshold cryptography is concerned with situations where the authority to initiate or perform cryptographic operations is distributed amongst a group of individuals. Many standard
constructions of single-user cryptography have counterparts in threshold cryptography.
A signature scheme is an algorithm for generating and verifying (electronic) signatures for documents. A sub-class of signature schemes deals with the shared-generation and shared-veri cation
of signatures, where a collaborating group of individuals is required to perform these actions.
A new paradigm of security has recently been introduced into cryptography with the emergence
of the ideas of Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Cryptography. As opposed to classical
cryptography, where various mathematical techniques are used to restrict eavesdroppers from
learning the contents of encrypted messages, in quantum key distribution the information is protected by the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics. A non-Turing model of computation
can be also be based on the formalism of quantum mechanics. Various computations, notably
the factorization of integers into primes, could be done on such machines with unprecedented
parallelism.

0.48 De ning Terms
secret sharing: protecting a secret key by distributing it in such a way that only the authorized
individuals can recreate the key.
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access structure: a formal speci cation of the participants in a secret sharing scheme which
are able to recreate a shared key from their portions of the key.

geometric secret sharing : a realization of a secret sharing scheme using nite geometry.
Usually either ane or projective geometries are used.

group cryptosystems : a recent development where cryptographic operations are performed
by groups instead of individuals.

perfect secret sharing : in such a scheme it is impossible to deduce any partial information
about a shared key, from less than the critical number of shares of the key.

signature schemes: an algorithm which generates and veri es a cryptographic signature.
threshold scheme: a secret sharing scheme with a uniform access structure in which any
collection of share holders greater than a given threshold can recreate the secret.

quantum cryptosystem: methods

of
securely
exchanging
private
keys
across an insecure channel in which the principles of quantum mechanics are used.

quantum computation: a theoretical model of computer based on the principles of quantum
mechanics. It is known that factoring of integers could be done in polynomial time on
such a machine.

0.49 Further Information
As in the previous chapter we mention the conferences: CRYPTO, EUROCRYPT, ASIACRYPT,
AUSCRYPT, and conferences dealing with security such as ACISP. Journals such as the Communications of the ACM. Quantum cryptography is also covered in the physics literature, e.g,
Europhys. Letters, Physical Review Letters.

Acknowledgements
We thank Anish Mathuria and Hossein Ghodosi for all their comments and suggestions which
have greatly helped us improve our exposition.
43

References
[1] J. C. Benaloh. Secret sharing homomorphisms: keeping shares of a secret secret. Proc.
Crypto'86. LNCS Vol. 263, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1987, pp. 251-260.
[2] J. Benaloh and J. Leichter. Generalized secret sharing and monotone functions. Proc.
CRYPTO'88, LNCS, Vol. 403, pp. 27-35, Springer-Verlag, 1989.
[3] C. H. Bennett. Quantum cryptography using any two nonorthogonal states. Phys. Rev.
Lett., 68 (1992), 3121-3124.
[4] C. H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail, and J. Smolin. Experimental quantum
cryptography. J. Cryptology, 5 (1992), 3-28.
[5] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard. Quantum cryptography: Public-key distribution and coin
tossing. Proc. IEEE Int. Conference on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, IEEE,
New York (1984), 175-179.
[6] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and A. K. Ekert. Quantum cryptography. Scienti c American,
October 1992, 50-57.
[7] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard and J.-M. Robert. Privacy ampli cation by public discussion.
SIAM Journal on Computing, 17(2):210-229, 1988.
[8] M. Bertilson and I. Ingemarsson. A construction of practical secret sharing schemes using
linear block codes, Proc. AUSCRYPT'92, LNCS, Vol. 718, pp. 67-79, Springer-Verlag, 1993.
[9] T. Beth, D. Jungnickel and H. Lenz. Design Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.
[10] T. Beth. Multifeature security through homomorphic encryption. Proc. Asiacrypt'94. LNCS
Vol. 917, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1993, pp 3-17.
[11] A. Beutelspacher. Enciphered geometry: some applications of geometry to cryptography.
Discrete Applied Mathematics, 37:59-68, 1988.
[12] G. R. Blakley. Safeguarding Cryptographic keys. Proc. N.C.C.. AFIPS Conference Proceedings 48, Vol. 48, pp. 313-317, 1979.
44

[13] B. Blakley, G. R. Blakley, A. H. Chan, and J. L. Massey. Threshold schemes with disenrollment. Proc. Crypto'92. LNCS Vol. 740, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1992, pp. 546-54.
[14] G. R. Blakley and C. Meadows. Security of ramp schemes. Proc. CRYPTO'84, LNCS,
Vol. 196, pp. 242-268, Springer-Verlag, 1985.
[15] C. Blundo, A. De Santis, D. R. Stinson and U. Vaccaro. Graph decompositions and secret
sharing schemes. J. of Cryptology, 8(1):39-64, 1995.
[16] C. Boyd. Digital Multisignatures. In H. Beker and F. Piper, editors, Cryptography and
Coding, pages 241-246. Clarendon Press, 1989.
[17] G. Brassard. Modern Cryptology: A Tutorial. Springer, Berlin 1988.
[18] E. F. Brickell. Some ideal secret sharing schemes, Journal of Combinatorial Mathematics
and Combinatorial Computing, 6:105-113, 1989.
[19] E. F. Brickell and D. M. Davenport. On the classi cation of ideal secret sharing schemes.
Journal of Cryptology, 4:123-134, 1991.
[20] E. F. Brickell and D. R. Stinson. The detection of cheaters in threshold schemes. Proc.
Crypto'88. LNCS, Vol. 403, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1990, pp. 564-577.
[21] E. F. Brickell and D. R. Stinson. Some improved bounds on the information rate of perfect
secret sharing schemes. Journal of Cryptology, 5:153-166, 1992.
[22] L. Brown, M. Kwan, J. Pieprzyk and J. Seberry, \Improving resistance to di erential
cryptanalysis and the redesign of LOKI," in Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of ASIACRYPT '91 (R. R. H. Imai and T. Matsumoto, eds.), vol. 739 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 36-50, Springer-Verlag, 1993.
[23] R. Capocelli, A. DeSantis, L. Gargano and U. Vaccaro, \On the size of shares for secret
sharing schemes," Proc. CRYPTO '91, LNCS Vol. 576, pp. 101-113, Springer-Verlag, 1992.
[24] M. Cerecedo, T. Matsumoto, and H. Imai. Ecient and Secure Multiparty Generation
of Digital Signatures Based on Discrete Logarithms. IEICE Trans. Fundamentals, E76A(4):531-545, April 1993.
45

[25] C-C. Chang and F-Y Liou. A Digital Multisignature Scheme Based upon the Digital Signature Scheme of a Modi ed ElGamal Public Key Cryptosystem. Journal of Information
Science and Engineering, 10:423-432, 1994.
[26] C. Charnes, J. Pieprzyk and R. Safavi-Naini. Families of threshold schemes. Proc. 1994
IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory. Trondheim, Norway, 1994.
[27] C. Charnes, J. Pieprzyk and R. Safavi-Naini. Conditionally secure secret sharing schemes
with disenrollment capability. 2nd ACM Conf. on Computer and Communications Security.
Nov. 2-4 1994, Fairfax, Viriginia, ACM 1994, pp. 89-95.
[28] C. Charnes and J. Pieprzyk. Disenrollment capability of conditionally secure secret sharing schemes. Proc. International Symposium on Information Theory and Its Applications
(ISITA'94). Nov. 20-25 1994, Sydney, Australia, IEA, NCP 94/9 1994, pp. 225-227.
[29] C. Charnes, J. Pieprzyk. Cumulative arrays and generalised Shamir secret sharing schemes.
17th Australasian Computer Science Conference. Australian Computer Science Communications, Vol. 16, 1, 1994, pp. 519-528.
[30] C. Charnes, J. Pieprzyk. Generalised cumulative arrays and their application to secret
sharing schemes. 18th Australasian Computer Science Conference. Australian Computer
Science Communications, 17, 1, 1995, pp. 61-65.
[31] G. Chaudhry and J. Seberry. Secret sharing schemes based on Room squares. Combinatorics, Complexity and Logic DMTCS'96, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1996, pp. 158-167.
[32] B. Chor, S. Goldwasser, S. Micali and B. Awerbuch. Veri able secret sharing and achieving
simultaneity in the presence of faults. Proc. 26th IEEE Symp. Found. Comp. Sci., pp.
383-395, 1985.
[33] J. Cooper, D. Donovan and J. Seberry. Secret sharing schemes arising from Latin squares.
Bull. ICA, 12 (1994), 33-43.
[34] Y. Desmedt. Society and group oriented cryptography: A new concept. In C. Pomerance,
editor, Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO '87, volume 293 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 120-127. Springer-Verlag, 1988.
46

[35] Y. Desmedt and Y. Frankel, \Threshold cryptosystems," in Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO '89 (G. Brassard, ed.), vol. 435 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pp. 307-315, Springer-Verlag, 1990.
[36] Y. Desmedt and Y. Frankel, \Shared generation of authenticators and signatures," in Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO '91 (J. Feigenbaum, ed.), vol. 576 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pp. 457-469, Springer-Verlag, 1992.
[37] D. Deutsch. Quantum theory, the Church-Turing principle and the universal quantum
computer. Proc. R. Soc. London, Ser. A, 400 (1985), 96-117.
[38] D. Deutsch. Quantum computational networks. Proc. R. Soc. London, Ser. A, 425 (1989),
73-90.
[39] W. Die and M. Hellman. New Directions in Cryptography. IEEE Trans. on Inform.
Theory, vol. IT-22, pp. 644-654, Nov. 1976.
[40] D. P. DiVincenzo. Quantum computation. Science, 270 (1995), 255-261.
[41] T. ElGamal. A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature Scheme Based on Discrete
Logarithms. IEEE Trans. on Inform. Theory, vol. IT-31, pp. 469-472, July 1985.
[42] A. K. Ekert. Quantum cryptography based on Bell's theorem. Phys. Rev. Lett., 67 (1991),
661-663.
[43] A. K. Ekert, J. G. Rarity, P. R. Tapster and G. M. Palma. Practical quantum cryptography
based on two-photon interferometry. Phys. Rev. Lett., 69 (1992), 1293-1295.
[44] Y. Frankel and Y. Desmedt. Classi cation of Ideal Homomorphic Threshold Schemes Over
Finite Abelian Groups. Proc. EUROCRYPT '92, LNCS, Vol. 658, 25-34, Springer-Verlag,
1993.
[45] R. G. Gallagher Information Theory and Reliable Communications. John Wiley & Sons,
New York, NY, 1968.
[46] H. Ghodosi, J. Pieprzyk and R. Safavi-Naini. Dynamic threshold cryptosystems. Proceedings
of PRAGOCRYPT'96, CTU Publishing House, Prague, Part 1, pp.370-379, 1996.
47

[47] L. Harn. Group-oriented (t, n) threshold digital signature scheme and digital multisignature.
IEE Proc.-Comput. Digit. Tech., 141(5):307-313, September 1994.
[48] L. Harn and S. Yang. Group-Oriented Undeniable Signature Schemes without the Assistance
of a Mutually Trusted Party. In J. Seberry and Y. Zheng, editors, Advances in Cryptology
- Proceedings of AUSCRYPT '92, volume 718 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
133-142. Springer-Verlag, 1993.
[49] T. Hwang. Cryptosystem for group oriented Cryptography. Proc. Eurocrypt'90. LNCS Vol.
473, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1990, pp. 353-360.
[50] S.-J. Hwang and C.-C. Chang. A dynamic secret sharing scheme with cheater detection.
Proc. ACISP'96, LNCS, Vol. 1172, 1996, pp. 48-55.
[51] K. Itakura and K. Nakamura. A public-key cryptosystem suitable for digital multisignature.
NEC J. Res. Dev., 71 edition, October 1983.
[52] M. Ito, A. Saito and T. Nishizeki. Secret sharing scheme realising general access structure.
Proc. Globecom'87, pp. 99-102, 1987.
[53] W-A. Jackson and K .M. Martin. Cumulative arrays and geometric secret sharing schemes.
Proc. Auscrypt'92. LNCS, Vol. 718, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1993, pp. 49-55.
[54] E. D. Karnin, J. W. Greene and M. E. Hellman. On secret sharing systems. IEEE Transactions Info. Theory, IT-29, No. 1:35-41, 1983.
[55] C-S. Laih and S-M. Yen. Multi-Signature for Speci ed Group of Veri ers. Journal of
Information Science and Engineering, 12(1):143-152, March 1996.
[56] S. K. Langford. Threshold DSS signatures without a trusted party. Proc. Crypto'95. LNCS,
Vol. 963, 397-409, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
[57] C-M. Li, T. Hwang, and N-Y. Lee. Threshold-Multisignature Schemes where Suspected
Forgery Implies Traceability of Adversarial Shareholders. In A. De Santis, editor, Advances
in Cryptology - Proceedings of EUROCRYPT '94, volume 950 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 194-204. Springer-Verlag, 1995.
48

[58] Hung-Yu Lin and Lein Harn. A generalized secret sharing scheme with cheater detection.
Proc. Asiacrypt'91. LNCS Vol. ?? Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1993, pages 149-158.
[59] J. L. Massey. Minimal codewords and secret sharing. Proc. 6th Joint Swedish-Russian
Workshop in Information Theory, 276-279, 1993.
[60] K. Martin and W.-A. Jackson. Perfect Secret Sharing Schemes on Five Participants. Designs
Codes and Cryptography, 9:267-286, 1996.
[61] R. J. McEliece and D. V. Sarwate. On Sharing Secrets and Reed-Solomon Codes. Communications of the ACM, 24(9):683-584, 1981.
[62] MacWilliams and N. J. A. Sloane. Theory of Codes. North Holland, 1977.
[63] A. Muller, J. Breguet and N. Gisin. Experimental demonstration of quantum cryptography
using polarised photons in optical bre over more than 1 km. Europhys. Lett., 23 (1993),
383-388.
[64] National Bureau of Standards, Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS), US, Department of Commerce, Data Encryption Standard, 46 ed., Jan. 1977.
[65] W. Ogata and K. Kurosawa. Lower Bound on the size of shares of nonperfect secret sharing
schemes. Proc. Asiacrypt'94. LNCS Vol. 917, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1995, pp. 33-41.
[66] W. Ogata, K. Kurosawa, and S. Tsujii. Nonperfect secret sharing schemes. Proc.
Auscrypt'92. LNCS Vol. 718, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1993, pp. 56-66.
[67] K. Ohta and T. Okamoto. A Digital Multisignature Scheme Based on the Fiat-Shamir
Scheme. In R.L. Rivest H. Imai and T. Matsumpto, editors, Advances in Cryptology Proceedings of ASIACRYPT '91, volume 739 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
139-148. Springer-Verlag, 1993.
[68] C. Park and K. Kurosawa. New ElGamal Type Threshold Digital Signature Scheme. IEICE
Trans. Fundamentals, E79(1):86-93, January 1996.
[69] A. Renvall and C. Ding. The access structure of some secret sharing schemes. Proc.
ACISP'96, LNCS, Vol. 1172, 67-86, Springer-Verlag, 1996.
49

[70] R. Rivest, A. Shamir and L. Adleman. A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and
Public-Key Cryptosystems. Communications of the ACM, vol. 21, 120-126, Feb. 1978.
[71] R. Rivest, A. Shamir and L. Adleman. On Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems. MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, Technical Report, MIT/LCS/TR-212 (January 1979).
[72] P. J. Schellenberg and D. R. Stinson. Threshold schemes from combinatorial designs. Journal of Combinatorial Mathematics and Combinatorial Computing, 5:143-160, 1989.
[73] B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C, John
Wiley & Sons, New York, 1994.
[74] Jennifer Seberry and Josef Pieprzyk. Cryptography: an Introduction to Computer Security.
Prentice-Hall, Sydney, 1989.
[75] A. Shamir. How to share a secret. Communications of the ACM, 22(11):612-613, 1979.
[76] A. Shimizu and S. Miyaguchi. Fast Data Encipherment Algorithm FEAL. Advances in
Cryptology - Proceedings of EUROCRYPT '87 (D. Chaum and W. Price, eds.), vol. 304 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 267-278, Springer-Verlag, 1987.
[77] P. W. Shor. Algorithms for Quantum Computation: Discrete Log and Factoring. Proceedings of the 35th Annual Symposium on the Foundations of Computer Science, edited by S.
Goldwasser, IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, CA, 1994, 124-134.
[78] G. J. Simmons. How to (really) share a secret. Proc. Crypto'88. LNCS Vol. 403, SpringerVerlag, Berlin, 1989, 390-448.
[79] G. J. Simmons. An introduction to shared secret and/or shared control schemes and their
application. In Contemporary Cryptology - The Science of Information Integrity, G. J. Simmons ed., IEEE Press, New York, 1992, 441-497.
[80] G. J. Simmons, W.-A. Jackson and K. Martin. The geometry of shared secret schemes.
Bull. of the ICA, 1:71-88, 1991.

50

[81] M. De Soete, J.-J. Quisquater and K. Vedder. A signature with shared veri cation scheme.
In J. Brassard, editor, Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO '89, volume 435
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 253-262. Springer-Verlag, 1990.
[82] \Processing Information Systems. Cryptographic Protection. Cryptographic Algorithm,"
GOST 28147-89, pp. C1-C26, National Soviet Bureau of Standards, 1989.
[83] A. P. Street. De ning sets for t-designs and critical sets for Latin squares. New Zealand
Journal of Mathematics 21 (1992), 133-144.
[84] D. R. Stinson. An explication of secret sharing schemes. Designs, Codes and Cryptography,
2:357-390, 1992.
[85] D. R. Stinson and S. A. Vanstone. A combinatorial approach to threshold schemes. SIAM
Journal of Discrete Mathematics, 1:230-236, 1988.
[86] P. R. Tapster, J. G. Rarity and P. C. M. Owens. Violation of Bell's inequality over 4 km
of optical bre. Phys. Rev. Lett., 73 (1994), 1923-1926.
[87] M. Tompa and H. Woll. How to share a secret with cheaters, Journal of Cryptology,
1:133-138, 1988.
[88] P. D. Townsend, J. G. Rarity, and P. R. Tapster. Enhanced single photon fringe visibility
in a 10 km-long prototype quantum cryptography channel. Electron. Lett., 29 (1993), 12911293.
[89] S. Wiesner. Conjugate coding. SIGACT News 15, (1983), 78-88; original manuscript written
circa 1970.

51

